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FOREWORD
During much of the Cold War, the United States
and India were at odds. India, almost immediately after
obtaining its independence from the United Kingdom,
adopted a foreign policy based upon nonalignment.
This policy, at least in principle, was designed to give
the country autonomy in the realm of foreign affairs.
U.S. policymakers, focused on the containment of the
Soviet Union, looked askance at India’s unwillingness
to adopt an unequivocal stance against global communism during the Cold War. At one point, Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles characterized nonalignment
as “immoral.”
U.S.-India relations took an adverse turn quite
early in the Cold War following the U.S. decision in
1954 to forge a military alliance with India’s nettlesome neighbor, Pakistan. Ostensibly, Pakistan entered
this pact because of its staunch commitment to the
American anti-communist enterprise. However, for
all practical purposes, Pakistan pursued this accord to
obtain American military assistance to balance Indian
capabilities.
Apart from a fleeting moment of military cooperation in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war of
1962, the United States and India found little reason to
pursue any viable military contacts. By the early 1970s,
as the United States initiated diplomatic relations with
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), India drifted into
the Soviet strategic orbit. In an attempt to counter the
military prowess of the PRC, India increasingly came
to depend on the Soviet Union for security assistance.
The situation was hardly propitious for fostering any
form of military link with the United States.

vii

It would not be until the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the accompanying end to the Cold War
that any form of military cooperation with the United
States would prove possible. Yet, India’s pursuit of
a nuclear weapons program outside the scope of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty placed it at odds with
the United States and sharply limited the prospects for
defense cooperation. Ironically, the diplomatic aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests significantly contributed to an Indo-U.S. rapprochement. Specifically, it
resulted in an extended diplomatic dialogue and, eventually, a mutual understanding of each other’s security
concerns. Subsequently, the United States made a dramatic concession to India in the form of the U.S.-India
Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2008. Under the terms of
the agreement, the United States lifted a raft of sanctions that it had imposed on India as a consequence of
its nuclear tests in 1998.
Since that time, the two sides have made fitful
progress on defense cooperation. In considerable part,
starting especially from the time of the second Obama
administration, the growth and increasing assertiveness of Chinese military power has driven the topic
of U.S.-India defense cooperation. Despite a shared
concern, however, a number of impediments continue
to hobble this strategic partnership. At a global level,
India remains uncertain about the extent to which it
should align itself with the United States as it seeks
a balance of power with the PRC. At a regional level,
India remains wary about the historical legacy of the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship and frets about its possible
future. Finally, at a national level, segments of India’s
attentive public harbor doubts about the reliability of
the United States as a strategic partner. Furthermore,
differing organizational, military, and bureaucratic
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structures continue to impede the growth of this
relationship.
This monograph attempts to outline the history
of strategic cooperation, its current state, its existing
hurdles, and the possible pathways for enhancing the
U.S.-India relationship.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Across Democratic and Republican administrations, the United States has confronted the rise and
growing assertiveness of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in Asia. Faced with the PRC’s role in Asia
and beyond, the United States needs a viable strategic partner to balance the power of the PRC. Given
India’s own misgivings about the PRC, it should serve
as a natural partner. However, historical, cultural, and
structural factors have inhibited the process of strategic
cooperation. This monograph identifies the principal
hurdles to cooperation and seeks to identify possible
pathways toward a possible U.S.-India partnership.
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AN UNNATURAL PARTNERSHIP?
THE FUTURE OF U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC
COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
To many American observers assessing the political, military, and economic status quo in South Asia
today, India stands out as an obvious security partner
for the United States. From a U.S. perspective, India’s
geographical position bordering China and Pakistan
and astride one of the busiest and most critical maritime shipping routes on earth, its democratic political values, its title as the world’s largest democracy,
and our self-evidently shared concerns about India’s
neighbors all seem to make increased security cooperation a natural step for both countries. America’s
great military power and strategic reach, the Washington calculus goes, combined with India’s geostrategic
position and vast economic potential appear to be the
two sides of a solid, strategic marriage of convenience.
After all, both countries depend largely on maritime
trade for economic growth; both share concerns about
Chinese intentions and hegemonic, long-term, global
investments in strategic, raw materials; and both are
deeply troubled by an unstable state exporter of terrorism with nuclear weapons on India’s contentious
western borders. See figure 1.
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Figure 1. Critical Strategic Choke Points in the
Indian Ocean Region1
Indeed, viewed from the U.S. cultural perspective of a country bordered by vast oceans and benign
neighbors, India appears to be almost completely
surrounded by potential enemies, and thus in need
of powerful friends. China’s carefully planned and
growing assertiveness in the region, in particular,
suggests that New Delhi would welcome a strategic
ally, or at least a partner, to counterbalance China’s
rising economic and military power and its seemingly
boundless appetite for strategic resources. Pakistan’s
unstable political foundations, its forward-deployed
2

nuclear weapons, and its support for international
terrorist organizations like Lashkar-i-Taiba make it a
clear and present danger to both countries. Indeed, for
many American political and military leaders, this perception of a confluence of shared interests has become
almost an article of faith. Why would not India welcome a greater strategic partnership with the United
States?
However, it is not nearly so simple, nor as obvious,
from an Indian perspective. There are many issues
and concerns in India weighing against such a strategic partnership, at least as the United States generally
conceives one, and there are some complex obstacles
in the path toward greater cooperation. Questions
about trust, reliability, and motivations are deeply
rooted, and perceptions that the United States eventually comes to dominate and even bully its strategic
partners are real in New Delhi and beyond. National
pride, the persistent legacy of nonalignment, and concerns about the second- and third-order consequences
of such an augmented alliance generate wariness
among India’s political class. Moreover, the optics are
deteriorating; the percentage of Indians who view the
United States favorably has dropped from 70 percent
in 2015 to 49 percent today, and the percentage who
say they have confidence in the U.S. President has
fallen from 74 percent in 2015 to 40 percent today, creating a strong popular headwind against deeper ties.2
Some of the brief global, strategic assessments
made in Washington are certainly true at an objective
level. Pakistan is, of course, a country of great concern
to both India and the United States. China’s growing
power does make political and military leaders in both
New Delhi and Washington uneasy about its global
intentions. China’s island-building project in the
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South China Sea, in particular, is seen as a vexatious
fait accompli by New Delhi and Washington. However, the paradigms through which these concerns are
viewed from both capitals are quite different, and the
approaches to responding to the challenges that these
concerns present do not necessarily have any coincident space. Some common political assessments mentioned above, such as the U.S. assumption that because
it is surrounded by potential adversaries, India would
naturally seek strategic allies, are less pertinent. The
heritage of nonalignment still runs deep in India,
beyond a circle of strategists, academics, and military
planners. In any event, the political realities underpinning these concerns in New Delhi are far more complicated than Washington’s assumptions suggest. While
it is likely that both capitals do agree that some sort of
increased strategic cooperation, at least in some fields,
would benefit both countries, such an elevated partnership would likely take a form quite different from
most traditional American defense partnerships. Nevertheless, for a broad spectrum of reasons, India has
reservations about any deeper strategic partnership
with the United States, and concerns about the nature
of such cooperation, which may ultimately prove
insurmountable.
The purpose of this monograph is to outline these
differing perceptions, assess the assumptions and
expectations of both countries, examine the obstacles
in the path of greater cooperation, and suggest some
confidence-building steps which both sides could take
to move the bilateral security relationship forward.
First, the authors summarize briefly the current state
of play of the bilateral relationship within the context
of the past full year. We then lay out what each side
would want from the other in a strategic partnership,

4

both in terms of material cooperation as well as the
desired limits and boundaries of the relationship. We
then discuss the impediments to further cooperation
in some detail, with the intention of assisting analysts,
academics, and policymakers on both sides to understand each other better as well as exploring several
Indian concerns and reservations. This monograph is
not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of New
Delhi’s strategic position, but, rather, a primer for U.S.
military personnel preparing to engage with India in
particular on the reservations their interlocutors may
hold. In official contacts, the language of diplomacy
and the politeness of Indian Government officials
tend to mask the more difficult realities behind cordial
greetings and formulaic memoranda. This monograph
provides an assessment of those areas of possible
cooperation that have the greatest potential for an
enhanced, strategic partnership in the future. We will
then offer tactical-level recommendations for confidence-building and relatively easy steps for reducing
some of the impediments which are now obstructing
a meaningful deepening of the strategic relationship,
followed by brief conclusions and final observations.
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PARTNERSHIP
Under President Barack Obama
The Obama administration inherited a mixed
hand from the George W. Bush administration, which
dramatically improved relations with India. At the
same time, however, the Bush administration was
completely taken in by ardent professions to cooperate in the war on terrorism by Pakistan, which from
2001 to 2008 successfully played its favorite “double
5

game” with a deeply credulous White House. The
deceit began in late November 2001, when Pakistan
accepted the offer from President Bush for a facesaving exodus for the dozens of Pakistani military officers and Inter-Services Intelligence agents who were
advising the Taliban trapped in the Kunduz pocket in
northern Afghanistan. This exodus involved not only
Pakistani personnel but also hundreds of senior Taliban and al-Qaeda figures in blacked-out Pakistani
cargo aircraft. The exodus was later dubbed “Operation EVIL AIRLIFT” by appalled American personnel on the hills outside the city.3 Despite a steadily
increasing body of evidence that Pakistan was gleefully double-crossing a naïve American administration—receiving billions of dollars in U.S. military aid
and actively supporting and arming the Taliban and
other terrorist groups—the Bush administration was
never one to be distracted from its beliefs by facts.4
Working-level military and intelligence personnel
repeatedly saw their reports of hard proof of Pakistani
support to terrorists pushed back or downplayed by
upper levels of the Bush administration. Monograph
author M. Chris Mason saw this repeated multiple
times while at the U.S. Department of State prior to
2006. U.S. personnel on the ground in Pakistan cynically dubbed the ubiquitous Pakistani ploy of “arresting” a senior Taliban official 24 hours before the arrival
of a high-level U.S. visit to Islamabad, only to let him
go as soon as the official had flown home, Pakistan’s
“catch and release program.”5
The Bush administration was not only completely
taken in by Pakistan’s body of lies, but it also embedded dozens of senior- and mid-level U.S. political
appointees into the policy apparatus at the Department of State and elsewhere who accepted Pakistan
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as a loyal ally “hook, line, and sinker.”6 Colin Powell,
George W. Bush’s first Secretary of State, was misled
to favor Pakistan over India.7 There were plenty of
mid-level pro-Pakistan bureaucrats in important positions already, like Robin Raphel, who worked for
Cassidy & Associates, a lobbyist for Pakistan, before
returning to the Department of State. Raphel had her
security clearance revoked during a Federal investigation into evidence of espionage for Pakistan. She was
cleared and left government service, but it would be
naïve to think Pakistan’s influence on the U.S. bureaucracy ended there.8 Generations of U.S. military personnel have been showered with warm and gracious
“hospitality” by their Pakistani military counterparts
and treated like beloved comrades in arms, something India almost assiduously avoids. Pakistan also
actively targets inexperienced U.S. diplomatic and aid
personnel on their first tours with a slick propaganda
campaign.9
Despite the penetration of so many Pakistani apologists into the system, however, in 2006, the Bush
administration did achieve one game-changing, even
historic, policy success: the so-called “123 Agreement” (The United States-India Nuclear Cooperation
Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act).
The act, which formally became law in the waning days
of the Bush administration, effectively normalized
and recognized India as a nuclear power. The signing of the accord on October 10, 2008, by India’s thenExternal Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and thenU.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice capped a
3-year effort to put U.S.-Indian relations on a solid
foundation. President George W. Bush became enormously popular in India as a result. Prime Minister
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Singh said at the time, “the people of India deeply
love you, President Bush.”10
Nevertheless, despite this popularity, in January
2009, the Obama administration inherited a vast South
Asia policy apparatus, which, like a giant supertanker
on the high seas, would be slow to turn, even if there
were a captain at the helm rapidly spinning the wheel.
In fact, pro-Pakistan personnel in various parts of the
U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense
during the Obama administration collectively had a
similar effect on U.S. Government efforts to improve
ties and transfer technology to India as the antiAmerican bureaucrats in various parts of the Indian
Government have had on slowing down enhanced
security from the Indian side: they could significantly
slow it and partially dilute it, but not stop it. Nor was
Obama the type of leader to spin the wheel dramatically toward India in his first years in office.
However, the Obama administration was far less
prone to the politicization of intelligence than that of
his predecessor, and as evidence of Pakistan’s duplicity piled up, the realization grew in the U.S. national
policy apparatus that Pakistan was paying lip service
to cooperation in the War on Terror while actively promoting and exporting it.11 The Osama bin Laden raid
which assassinated the al-Qaeda leader in 2011 was
a kind of watershed in U.S. policy in South Asia—a
de facto de-hyphenating of India-Pakistan policy—
and it marked a tectonic shift away from a Pakistan
whose emperor now had few clothes toward an India
whose importance against a rising Pakistan-China axis
came into sharper focus. After the Osama bin Laden
raid in Abbottabad, the scales fell from most American bureaucratic eyes, and the pivot toward India
noticeably accelerated. Pakistan’s gamble in hosting
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and protecting bin Laden had backfired. Obama now
moved more assertively to “spin the wheel of the
supertanker,” to turn the ship of state toward India,
and to advance U.S.-India strategic cooperation. The
Obama administration first reached out to India on
important environmental issues, and then named
India a major defense partner. India agreed to buy six
nuclear reactors from the United States in 2017. The
capstone of U.S.-India rapprochement was Obama’s
attendance as chief guest at India’s Republic Day
celebrations in January 2015, the first U.S. President
ever so honored.12 The New York Times described the
enhanced relationship as “one of Mr. Obama’s most
important foreign policy achievements.”13
Equally significant for the U.S.-India strategic relationship, the United States turned away from Pakistan
in seemingly irreversible ways. The Pakistan lobby
with the U.S. Government was discredited and marginalized. Obama, still hopeful that Pakistan would
come to its senses and stop sponsoring terrorists as a
matter of state policy, gradually reduced military aid
to Pakistan in the last 4 years of his administration by
two-thirds, while pressing diplomatically for a change
in Pakistani behavior.14 The stage was set for a new
U.S. President.
Uncertainties Under President Donald Trump
The Trump administration inherited a strong hand
from the Obama administration as far as the security
partnership with India was concerned. Despite continuing disagreements about how best to deal with
Pakistan’s ongoing involvement with a variety of terrorist groups, the two sides made significant progress
on other fronts. India contracted to purchase a range
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of military equipment from the United States. After
myriad delays, it signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement. Many of these developments
came to fruition thanks to the efforts of then-Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter. Though not publicized,
it can be inferred that Carter devoted a significant
amount of time and effort to courting India because
of the many uncertainties associated with the dramatic rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in
Asia. India, in turn, responded well to these overtures
because of its own misgivings about the PRC’s interests and goals in South Asia and beyond.
The Trump administration, to its credit, has already
sent then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis to India.
Even though his visit did not yield any substantive
results, it was important from a symbolic standpoint.15
However, Mattis did urge India to step up its role in
Afghanistan with a view toward stabilizing the country. The most important development has involved
India’s trying neighbor, Pakistan. In January 2018,
following a tweet from Trump, the U.S. Government
suspended a further US$2 billion in assistance to Pakistan.16 The rationale for the U.S. cutoff of remaining
aid was straightforward: Pakistan has failed, despite
multiple entreaties on the part of the United States, to
end its support for terror, especially in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s use of terrorist proxies and the U.S.
inability or unwillingness to impose sufficient costs on
the country to effect significant change has long been
an Indian complaint. Therefore, the Trump administration’s decision to take a harder line has been
received with much approval in New Delhi. Previous
administrations privately—and, on the rare occasion,
publicly—upbraided Pakistan. However, in the end,
each side chose not to proceed far down this path.
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Of course, skeptics in New Delhi continue to express
doubts about the U.S. willingness to sustain this new
approach as Pakistan withdraws various forms of
ongoing cooperation.17
The Trump administration appears mostly inclined
to continue to build upon the ongoing security partnership with India. India, for its part, also appears to
be willing to invest modestly in the partnership, and is
especially keen on acquiring a range of weapon technologies from the United States. One key uncertainty,
however, continues to dog the relationship, which
could have significant consequences for its evolution.
This involves the potential sale of the complete production line of the U.S. F-16 fighter to India. This transfer of technology could conceivably address India’s
acute need for a medium multi-role combat aircraft—a
matter that, despite multiple rounds of discussions
with potential suppliers, remains unresolved. As part
of its effort to boost defense sales, the Trump administration would obviously be in favor of India purchasing the entire production line. However, as with all
major Indian defense acquisitions, this too has become
a fraught issue. A number of Indian armchair strategists have vigorously opposed the possible acquisition of the fighter on the grounds that the United
States may withhold critical upgrade technologies,
that Pakistan possesses an earlier version of the F-16,
and that it is dated and obsolete technology.18 These
objections are likely to become more strident should
the Indian Ministry of Defense express further interest
in the matter. However, even before that stage arrives,
the Trump administration still faces the sloth-like and
dilatory procedures that dog India’s weapons acquisition process. The U.S.-India strategic partnership
would receive a significant boost should India, despite
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various objections from members of its defense policy
establishment, choose to acquire the F-16 production
line. However, the prospects of this outcome remain
murky.
One other matter could complicate the U.S.-India
strategic partnership. This involves India’s recently
announced policy of “Make in India”—one that is at
odds with the Trump administration’s focus on boosting domestic manufacturing.19 Many view this emphasis on enhancing India’s indigenous manufacturing
capacity as a throwback to an earlier era in Indian
economic policymaking, one that failed to contribute
much to the country’s economic growth and wellbeing. How the Trump administration deals with
India on this issue could shape, in considerable measure, the future of the strategic partnership.
These hurdles notwithstanding, it is nevertheless
unlikely that there will be significant backsliding in
the relationship via negative statements. The Trump
administration has few illusions about the PRC’s rise
and how it may impinge on U.S. strategic interests.
Simultaneously, India is in no position to cope with
the threat from the PRC on its own. Consequently,
this common concern alone is likely to ensure that the
strategic partnership does not “wither on the vine.”
Indeed, an agreement reached in the fall of 2018
demonstrated that the momentum in U.S.-India relations has not stalled. Specifically, after much deliberation, India signed the Communications Compatibility
and Security Agreement with the United States. This
accord is intended to facilitate military interoperability and enable the sharing of operational intelligence.
Under its aegis, India has also started discussions with
the United States to acquire 22 armed Sea Guardian
drones.20

12

Current State of Political Play in India
During the tenure of the two United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) regimes (2004-2009 and 2009-2014),
substantial progress was made in U.S.-India relations.
The most significant of these, of course, was the signing of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement of 2008.
Unfortunately, the UPA regime was unable to pass
suitable, enabling legislation that would allow American firms involved in the nuclear industry to invest
in India without facing substantial liabilities in the
event of a nuclear accident. Consequently, while at the
political-diplomatic level, an important irritant in the
relationship was effectively removed, and the potential concomitant commercial benefits that might have
accrued to the United States, unfortunately, remained
unrealized. Not surprisingly, this has proven to be a
significant disappointment to the United States.
The other important development that marked
the tenure of the UPA regime was the forging of the
Defense Technology and Trade Initiative of 2012.
Though expressly not a treaty, the initiative was
designed to facilitate trade in defense technology and
reduce hurdles in the field of weapon technology
transfers. Several projects are already underway while
others are in the pipeline.
In considerable part, the U.S.-India security relationship did not progress more significantly because
of the unease of Indian Minister of Defense A. K.
Antony. Antony, whose constituency was in the
southern state of Kerala, had serious misgivings about
an overly close security relationship with the United
States. Indeed, it is remarkable that even reasonable
progress was made during his tenure in office.
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The current political context is quite different under
the National Democratic Alliance regime of Prime
Minister Narendra Modi. The remaining impediments
to improving the relationship are mostly institutional
and are not amenable to dramatic changes. On the
other hand, India now has a regime that is markedly
different for at least two compelling reasons. First,
it does not carry the ideological baggage which the
Congress-led UPA regimes simply could not shed.
Many within the Congress leadership harbored misgivings about the United States based upon historical grievances and slights. Modi could have taken
umbrage over the visa that was denied to him in 2005
(because of his possible role in a program that took
place in Gujarat in 2002). However, he has obviously
chosen to ignore that slight. More to the point, as a
regional politician, he is not sandbagged with the
weight of past differences which characterized U.S.-India relations at the national level.
Second, Modi and his principal advisers have a
worldview that is quite different from that of his predecessors. They have brought into office a more pragmatic approach to international politics that recognizes
the importance of material power. This approach has
deep roots in the ideology and beliefs of the Bharatiya Janata Party.21 This outlook has led Modi to adopt
tougher stances toward India’s two long-standing
adversaries, Pakistan and the PRC. India’s more assertive stance toward China can dovetail with a longterm U.S. concern about the rise and aggressiveness of
the PRC in Asia.
India is fast becoming a major importer of U.S.
military equipment. Despite Modi’s professed commitment to a “Make in India” policy, given the state
of the Indian defense industry, in all likelihood, it will
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continue to rely on the United States as a major supplier for its weapons acquisitions. Obviously, there
still remains a need to rely on Russia for some of
India’s weaponry, not to mention the existence of various constituencies within the Indian security establishment which favor Russia.
This stems from path dependence. The Soviet
Union, during much of the Cold War, was India’s
principal defense supplier. Consequently, a disproportionate segment of India’s military hardware remains
of Soviet/Russian origin. Given this background, it
has proven difficult for the Indian military to wean
itself off of its reliance on Russian weaponry. Furthermore, within the defense establishment, there is still
a persistent belief that the Russians constitute a more
reliable supplier than the United States.
These issues notwithstanding, it is important to
underscore that as of 2014, the United States surpassed
Russia as India’s principal weapons supplier.22 Modi’s
stated policy of “Make in India” need not bring an end
to the arms transfer relationship. Instead, under the
aegis of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative,
the two countries can move forward with an actual
process of technology transfer. Indeed, in the wake of
Mattis’s visit to India in September 2017, the possibility of India acquiring the technology to build the F-16,
and perhaps the F-18 as well, are under discussion.23
Of course, given India’s legendary glacial weapons
acquisition process—one that Modi has not been able
to streamline since taking office—it is unclear when a
decision might be made on these weapons systems.
Overall, as a result of this constellation of factors,
matters are far more propitious than in the past for
advancing the U.S.-India security partnership. As long
as the National Democratic Alliance regime remains in
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office, barring some unforeseen set of circumstances,
there is reason to believe that the strategic partnership
will continue to head in a positive direction.
WHAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS
FROM INDIA
The area of the security partnership that the United
States would most like to strengthen—the cooperation
and interoperability of conventional military forces—
is one of the security sectors which, for a number of
reasons, holds the least promise for significant progress. Currently, military-to-military cooperation is
planned by a bilateral military cooperation group, and
each of the three primary services for both countries
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) has an executive steering group. The executive steering group now meets
annually to discuss joint training exercises and other
forms of military-to-military cooperation. Of the three
services, by far the most training exercises have been
conducted by the two navies, as these occur out at sea
and far from the public eye.
Ground force exercises have been and continue
to be, by political necessity, quite small (company
level), and the exercises held in India are conducted
in remote, rural areas. Although attitudes may be
changing slowly, the Indian public is not ready to
countenance any significant U.S. military presence in
India, even for short training exercises. Furthermore,
much of the exercise and training activities that occur
revolve around humanitarian relief and disaster readiness drills rather than combat operations. The two air
forces have also conducted training exercises, but the
primary sticking point with air force cooperation is
that the Indian Air Force operates primarily Russian
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combat aircraft. While the U.S. Air Force would certainly welcome the opportunity to fly head-to-head
in mock engagements with Russian-made aircraft,
India cannot reveal and compromise the full capabilities of their aircraft without potentially angering and
alienating their Russian suppliers. As a result, in practical terms, the joint Air Force exercises are largely a
“getting-to-know-you” and goodwill exercise for the
pilots of both countries.
These modest joint training exercises are unlikely
to be expanded in scope any time soon because of a
larger underlying dichotomy between U.S. and Indian
military orientations. The primary obstacle to significantly enhancing military-to-military cooperation lies
in the incompatibility of the purposes and missions of
the two countries’ armed forces. It could be fairly said
that they are almost diametrically opposed: India’s
military is designed almost exclusively for the internal
defense of India and its borders. The U.S. military, on
the other hand, is designed entirely for the projection
of military power outside the United States. The strategic mission of India’s military is defensive. Of course,
it can take the offensive at the operational and tactical
levels of war, but it is not designed or equipped for
the projection of power abroad. Although there have
been some developments in this regard, which will be
discussed later, the Indian armed forces have nearly
no power projection capability outside their immediate self-defense needs. The conventional U.S. military
is oriented toward operating overseas in support of
U.S. foreign policy. While the U.S. Army has strategic
mobility issues of its own in the Pacific, it nevertheless has a mission set which requires it. Thus, in discussions of military-to-military cooperation, Indian
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strategists often rhetorically ask U.S. visitors, “On
what would we cooperate?”
India has been the largest overall contributor to
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions since its
independence from Great Britain. However, although
these forces have faced (and continue to face) considerable danger and many Indian peacekeepers have been
killed on these deployments, they are tasked strictly
as observers and security providers, and assiduously
avoid combat in keeping with their instructions. It
appears for the foreseeable future that India will move
slowly and cautiously in any effort to acquire a capability to operate outside of India, much less exercise it,
for domestic, political reasons.
The possible exception to this “go-slow” approach
to strengthening India’s ability to influence events
well beyond its borders may be the Indian Navy.
India’s new aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, initially
planned to commence sea trials in 2013, is now scheduled to begin trials in 2019, 10 years after her keel
was laid down. She is primarily designed to launch
and recover the Russian MiG29K aircraft. The first
Arihant-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was commissioned in 2016.
The second submarine in the class, the INS Arighat,
was launched in November 2017 and is expected to
be commissioned at the end of 2019. Both were developed under the U.S.-sponsored Advanced Technology
Vessel program at the cost of US$2.9 billion, a very
significant example of U.S.-India security cooperation
in its own right. These three vessels may represent a
concerted, long-range effort by the Indian Government to demonstrate a credible nuclear deterrent
and develop a regional naval force with which to be
reckoned. Beyond this, however, India’s amphibious
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capability remains very modest, with no counterpart
to the U.S. Marine Corps. India’s experience with
projecting military power abroad is also very limited
and quite dated. Operations in Sri Lanka beginning in
1987 (Operations PAWAN, VARAAT, TRISHUL, and
CHECKMATE) are widely viewed as negative actions
within Indian circles and as failures that should not
be repeated.24 On the other hand, a commando raid
onto Male Island in the Maldives Islands (Operation
CACTUS) in 1988 was successful in eliminating coup
plotters against the government from the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam. However, few, if
any, personnel remain on active duty who participated
in these operations. A cross-border raid into Myanmar
dubbed a “counterinsurgency operation” in “hot pursuit” took place in June 2015. Little is known about
this incursion; however, the target was apparently one
or more guerrilla base camps just inside Myanmar territory. Ajai Sahni of the Institute of Conflict Management described it as a minor operation.25 In both cases,
the number of forces involved was small, and both
involved only special operations forces for a shortduration, raid-type mission.
“Counterinsurgency,” seemingly an area with
potential for increased military-to-military training and development, is a term that American planners have learned to use cautiously. For domestic,
political reasons, the Indian Government is sensitive
about the use of the terms “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” with respect to the several internal,
anti-government guerrilla movements active inside
India. In any case, the Indian military generally does
not believe that counterinsurgency is an area of potential cooperation with the U.S. Army. Indian officers,
in general, believe the conflicts inside India are very
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specific in nature to the culture and society of India,
and that lessons learned from counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, are
not applicable to India’s guerrilla movements. The
Indian Government consistently portrays these armed
groups as “terrorists,” “bandits,” and “malcontents,”
and deliberately downplays their significance—again,
for domestic, political reasons. The Indian domestic
security apparatus and the Indian Army feel that they
have the situation well in hand, and representatives of
both elements can be sensitive if the subject is raised in
an open discussion.
WHAT INDIA WANTS FROM THE
UNITED STATES
During the Cold War, the United States and India
were mostly at odds, apart from a few moments of
fleeting strategic cooperation.26 In considerable part,
the U.S. military pact with Pakistan in 1954, coupled with India’s policy of nonalignment, kept the
two countries apart. Later, following the Sino-Indian
border war of 1962, some U.S.-India strategic cooperation did ensue, especially in terms of intelligence
collection on the PRC.27 However, this too ended,
following the U.S. overture toward the PRC in 1971.
Subsequent U.S. support for Pakistan during the East
Pakistan crisis led to a further estrangement, especially as India drifted into the Soviet orbit.
Even at the end of the Cold War, the two states
could not quickly find common ground. The absence
of much economic, diplomatic, or even cultural
ballast allowed two issues—nonproliferation and
human rights—to perpetuate a troubled relationship.
India’s opening of its markets in the aftermath of an
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unprecedented economic crisis in 1991 did lead to
a limited thawing of bilateral relations. However, it
was only in the wake of India’s nuclear tests that the
two parties finally embarked upon a meaningful diplomatic dialogue.28 Though India, for the most part,
refused to meet any U.S. demands, both countries
developed a better appreciation of each other’s concerns and expectations. Nevertheless, U.S. objections
to India’s nuclear weapons program remained a significant barrier to the development of any strategic
ties. At this juncture, then, what does India want of
the United States?
One of the principal impediments to enhanced
U.S.-India strategic cooperation remains the U.S. role
in Pakistan. This has two distinct components. The
first, of course, is the historical palimpsest. Despite
the passage of time, some within the Indian foreign
and security policy establishments harbor significant
misgivings about a closer U.S. security relationship
because of America’s historical closeness to Pakistan’s
military apparatus. The second, which is related to the
first, involves what many in both the Indian foreign
and security policy circles deem to be U.S. unwillingness to adopt an unequivocal stance against Pakistan’s
continuing dalliance with a range of home-grown terrorist organizations. Unless the United States is willing to address this issue directly, it will remain an
important hurdle to U.S.-India strategic cooperation.
Another factor that casts a long shadow involves
what many in India perceive as the inconstancy of
American policymaking, especially toward India’s
principal, long-term adversary, the PRC. In these individuals’ view, U.S. policy has oscillated on a number of
occasions, sometimes even within the span of a single
administration. Indian concerns about the fickleness of
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American policy are not chimerical. However, given
the sheer significance of the PRC to the United States,
it is unclear how Washington can adequately address
this Indian concern.29
Indian elites, for the most part, recognize that the
PRC is India’s principal, long-term threat. However,
they do not have a clear-cut consensus on how best
to cope with the challenge. At least three perspectives
exist on how best to deal with the PRC. The first leans
toward accommodation based on the assumption
that India does not have the strategic wherewithal to
mount a credible defense. A second argues for a policy
of self-help and the mobilization of India’s domestic
resources to cope with the challenge. Those who advocate for this policy would clearly eschew any reliance
on the United States to protect India’s security interests. A third position contends that India does need
to have a balance of power with the PRC and that it
should elicit the assistance of the United States in this
endeavor. However, even within this stance, there is
disagreement about the extent to which India should
firmly place its bets with the United States.
Another barrier to improved U.S.-India strategic
ties stems from a peculiar feature of India’s political
culture; namely, its insistence on “strategic autonomy.” This obdurate characteristic has roots in India’s
history of nonalignment, evidenced by persistent fear
of any loss of its sovereign status and its legacy as a
postcolonial state. At one level, this concern may well
be understandable given the historical experience of
the country. However, if India has any expectation of
eliciting cooperation from the United States to address
its extant security concerns, it will have to overcome
its reservations about a putative loss to its strategic
autonomy.
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Finally, India also hopes that the United States
may prove to be more forthcoming on the critical issue
of technology transfer. As noted, in the past several
years, the United States has emerged as a major weapons supplier to India. Most recently, India initiated
the purchase of 22 unarmed Guardian surveillance
drones from the United States.30 While these developments are entirely welcome, the question of technology transfer still remains on a case-by-case basis, as it
does with virtually every country to which the United
States sells weapons. Therefore, technology transfer is
at the mercy of mid-level bureaucrats within the State
Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
which could block or delay specific technology almost
indefinitely. Coupled with their intransigence, of
course, is the legendarily glacial movement of the
Indian defense acquisition process.
IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION
Different Military and Strategic Orientations
Briefly touched upon earlier, arguably the largest
obstacle to an expanded U.S.-India strategic alliance—
one that genuinely advances the security of both countries and stabilizes the South Asia region—is also the
most obvious: the two countries are virtually strategic polar opposites. Going beyond the standard bromides about the “world’s two largest democracies”31
and “shared concerns” about both China’s hegemonic economic intentions32 and Pakistan’s terrorists,33 the United States and India actually have little
strategic common ground. The United States has said
repeatedly that it wants India to play a greater role
in regional security and to act as a regional power
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that will counter China.34 The United States takes for
granted the assumption, based on its own strategic
philosophy of acting aggressively on the world stage,
that because India is also a large, populous democracy
with similar economic needs, it too would naturally
desire to project its interests beyond its borders and
exert its influence, at least over its own neighborhood.
That is, however, a poor assumption, and a good deal
of U.S.-India policy discussion falls into a hole of
misunderstanding as a result of this single strategic
dichotomy, due largely, in part, from the diplomatic
strategy of the United States.
For the most part, Indian leaders are perfectly well
aware of what the United States would like them to
do. However, India has little political will for gunboat
diplomacy and less interest in projecting hard power
abroad to act assertively as a “counter” to China or
anyone else. For example, India resisted intense pressure from the Bush administration in 2003 to send
troops to Iraq, even in a non-combat role.35 For its part,
the United States, as mentioned earlier, still very much
hopes India will grow to become a counterbalance to
rising Chinese power and influence in Asia. That is,
essentially, a misplaced hope. It is simply not how
India identifies itself politically in a strategic sense nor
how it popularly perceives its national historical character. In fact, India has a very limited ability to even
protect its own citizens abroad. In 2015, Operation
RAHAT required a permissive environment, the full
support of Saudi Arabia, the Indian national airline,
and numerous civilian merchant vessels to extract its
citizens (and approximately 1,000 foreigners) from
Yemen. Six other evacuations of Indian nationals
have also required permissive environments, diplomatic engagement, and civilian logistical muscle to
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implement.36 They were successful, even brilliant,
humanitarian evacuations, but they were not expeditionary military operations, nor could they have been.
From the forward-leaning worldview of the United
States—which India interprets as being permanently
engaged in a broad spectrum of nation-building
projects, state-building efforts, far-reaching strategic
defense alliances, and the almost-daily application of
military violence around the globe—India’s passiveness on the world stage is frustrating. It seems almost
banal to remark upon this perception, yet it often goes
overlooked in high-level dialog: India’s strategic military focus is almost entirely internal. While India has
global economic interests and, by some accounts, the
fastest growing economy in the world, the security of
those global interests almost entirely depends on the
kindness of strangers.37 This is not going to change significantly no matter how much the United States tries
to push it. In fact, history shows that the more India
is pushed by outside powers, the stronger its passive
resistance to that force becomes.38
The Indian Army and Air Force were deliberately
designed virtually exclusively for internal defense
and, until a decade ago, the Indian Navy was largely
a coastal defense force.39 India today has no significant expeditionary force projection capability beyond
a short-duration and short-range, commando-type
operation of possibly battalion size.40 With no dedicated soldiers trained specifically for amphibious warfare, similar to the U.S. Marine Corps, India would be
hard pressed to land the equivalent of a U.S. Marine
Expeditionary Unit in the Indian Ocean region and
sustain them in combat for any length of time. The
Indian Navy is in the process of building eight landing craft utility vessels, each capable of carrying 140
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soldiers,41 and recently announced an ambitious plan
to build four amphibious assault ships that are landing platform docks similar to the single vessel of the
Austin Class (the INS Jalashwa), which India currently
operates. However, these vessels have not yet been
designed; the earliest that the first one would join the
fleet in an operational capacity is at least a decade
from now.42 On the political side, the Sri Lanka intervention fiasco of the late 1980s left many in India with
little appetite for future foreign military entanglements; India learned the lessons of its Vietnam, while
the United States did not. This political orientation is
partly a natural reflection of India’s worldview, as discussed earlier, and also a consequence of India’s greatest security challenge since independence: maintaining
internal order.43 Furthermore, widespread poverty,
demands for access to sanitation, a lack of clean water,
and rapid population growth—which shows no signs
of slowing before 2050 at the earliest—suggest that
India will lack the economic means to develop a military with counterbalancing regional throw weight in
the future, even if the political desire to do so were to
grow significantly beyond its current level.44
Domestic Indian Political Sensitivities
One of the principal impediments to U.S.India defense cooperation can be traced to a reflexive,
anti-American streak that exists in India’s political
culture. The sources of this strain are at least threefold. First, India’s political culture is an artifact of the
British colonial legacy. Ainslie Embree, a noted historian of modern India, has discussed the origins of
this at some length. He argues that the Indian elite
inherited many of the cultural prejudices of the British
ruling class in India.45
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An element of anti-Americanism has long existed
within this elite, which successfully transmitted these
biases to their post-colonial successors. In their eyes,
Americans were deemed to be boorish, lacking in cultural mores, and not especially cosmopolitan. These
attitudes, for the most part, are now starting to dissipate with generational change. However, this attitude
still persists among some segments of the Indian elite.
Second, America’s long-term strategic relationship with Pakistan still casts a long shadow over U.S.India ties.46 Entire generations of Indians saw the
United States supporting Pakistan during much of
the Cold War. Of course, a closer examination of the
historical record reveals that the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership was hardly uniform or uninterrupted;
however, few remember the ruptures in the relationship. Instead, many within India’s strategic community focus on how the United States mostly supported
Pakistan at the UN Security Council on the Kashmir
dispute, forged a military pact with the country in
1954, and tilted toward Pakistan during the 1971 crisis.
Later, these individuals saw the United States turn to
Pakistan during the Soviet invasion and occupation of
Afghanistan. Furthermore, during this time, in their
view, the United States knowingly turned a blind eye
toward Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. Finally, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, the United States again sought
to court Pakistan to achieve its strategic objectives in
Afghanistan without sufficient regard for Indians’
concerns and sensitivities. India saw an unwillingness
by the United States to directly bring charges upon
Pakistan for its long-standing dalliance with a range
of terrorist groups, many of which had carried out acts
of terror on Indian soil.47 In a related vein, India also
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saw Pakistan as, at best, an untrustworthy and partial partner in the U.S. global counterterrorism strategy.48 This evaluation of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship,
its historical accuracy aside, continues to animate the
beliefs of a segment of India’s strategic community. In
effect, these individuals view the United States with
a large degree of mistrust and doubt that the United
States can be relied upon to address India’s security
concerns. In their worldview, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship vitiates the prospect of any meaningful strategic partnership with India.
Those who share these views do not put much
stock in the American efforts to “de-hyphenate” the
U.S.-Pakistan and U.S.-India relations. During President William Clinton’s first term, U.S. Ambassador
to India Frank Wisner sought to separate the U.S.Pakistan relationship from U.S. ties to India.49 Nevertheless, this effort, though lauded in New Delhi at
the time, did not fully persuade those who were convinced that the United States would effectuate this
policy.
Third, the distrust of the United States also stems
from India’s tradition of nonalignment. Some within
India’s attentive public recognized that nonalignment
as a foreign policy doctrine was all but moribund after
the Cold War. However, others did not share this
view. Under the previous UPA regime, nonalignment
was resurrected under the guise of the pursuit of strategic autonomy. The present government, however,
has not invoked the doctrine and has shown scant
interest in the remnants of this anachronistic movement.50 That said, there remains a core group of politicians, analysts, and activists who are still wedded
to some variant of strategic autonomy and see some
merit in resurrecting it.51 Consequently, with a change

28

of administrations, some policy offspring of this doctrine may be revived. The proponents of the doctrine
would argue that an excessive dependence on the
United States would invariably hamper India’s ability to make its own strategic choices. A variant of
this “nonalignment/strategic autonomy” paradigm,
which might be dubbed “nonalignment redux,” contends that strategic alignment with the United States
could needlessly provoke the PRC.52 Advocates of this
view fear that in the event of a conflict with the PRC,
the United States is likely to stand on the sidelines and
not come to India’s assistance. Consequently, in their
assessment, closer U.S.-India strategic ties could actually redound to India’s disadvantage.
Obviously, none of these perspectives is entirely
insurmountable. However, they also suggest that
enhancing the U.S.-India strategic partnership will
require close attention to these domestic, political sensitivities. Ignoring them could lead to more flawed
assumptions and thereby derail future progress.
The Trust Deficit
As China’s power and presence in the region grow,
the U.S. bilateral relationship with Pakistan reaches
troubling new lows, and the strategic situation in
Afghanistan continues to deteriorate. The United
States sees the deepening and broadening of its security relationship with India as intuitively worthwhile.
However, as discussed previously, the value of such
an expanded security partnership is not as obvious
from the Indian perspective. Beyond the political and
strategic calculus, there are several additional sociocultural issues and concerns in India which weigh
against aspects of a broader strategic partnership, at
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least as the United States normally conceives it. The
most significant of these factors can arguably be summarized as concerns over relational inequality, doubts
about long-term reliability, political fallout, and the
potential defense and readiness consequences of being
drawn too closely into the U.S. security orbit. These
factors are actually interwoven and tend to flow elusively into one another in conversation whenever an
interlocutor tries to tease them apart, debate them, or
counter each individually.
At or near the top of the list of these concerns is
resistance in the Indian body politic to any perception
of an unequal relationship. There is a sense in multiple sectors of Indian political life which the authors
have heard often that in alliances and strategic relationships, the United States eventually comes to think
of itself as “first among equals,” not least because of
its faith in its enormous military power. This concern,
that the United States gradually presumes a de facto
leadership role and a position of dominance in any
bilateral relationship, is real and current in New Delhi.
Indian leaders are certainly aware of the pressure the
United States exerted on its long-time strategic partner, Great Britain, in the run-up to the Iraq war, not
only to help beat the war drums across the Atlantic but also to participate militarily in the invasion of
Iraq in 2003.53 Involvement in such foreign military
adventures is anathema to Indian foreign policy, and
the feeling that “the tiger cannot change his stripes”
makes an Indian political class already wary of foreign entanglements even more resistant to anything
that resembles vulnerability to policy pressure from
the United States. There is real resistance to a strategic
commitment which might lead to unequal standing,
and to any security cooperation with a potential to
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morph into a paternalistic, “big brother-little brother”
kind of relationship. While national pride in independence in India takes a subtly different form from that
found in some other parts of the world, it is nevertheless as strong a force as anywhere else, and India’s
leaders will not countenance India as a second-tier
partner to anyone. It is difficult to overstate the extent
to which this concern generates an almost organic
force of political resistance to the United States today,
like two great magnets holding each other apart.
Another major social stumbling block to greater
strategic cooperation is the issue of public trust and
its political consequences. In discussions with scholars and military officers in India, subtle questions
about U.S. reliability and motivations almost always
hover near the surface. U.S. leaders naturally proceed
from an assumption that the United States is a trustworthy, long-term ally and security partner. Indeed,
most Americans take this as a matter of national pride.
However, citizens of other countries sometimes take a
longer historical view. For example, some Indians will
privately and tactfully remind visitors from the United
States of former pledges of support which the United
States is seen to have abandoned, or instances where
Washington reversed policy course when it was politically expedient or when presidential administrations
changed—including during the Vietnam War; during
covert support to Iraqi Kurds in the 1950s; and, more
recently, in the Iran nuclear agreement and the Paris
Agreement on climate change.54 Global perceptions of
historical time vary: while 4 years seems like a veritable eternity of policy to many Americans and their
leaders, many other countries, including India and
China, tend to take a more long-term view. The argument is as follows: If the United States cannot maintain
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a steady course for even 4 years, how can India place
its strategic trust in the United States for 20 years or
more? Partisan politics in the United States can add to
the impression abroad that the United States cannot
always be relied on to maintain a reliable policy course
and not hang former allies out to dry when political
winds change. For example, at the time this monograph was written, Indian defense scholars and strategists watched carefully how the United States handled
its spoken and unspoken commitments to the Kurds
of Iraq in the face of pressure from Turkey, now that
U.S. military goals against the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria in Iraq have largely been accomplished through
reliance on Kurdish Peshmerga forces. India, which is
closely watching the unprecedented friction between
the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Europe, views the Trump
administration’s demands that the nations of Europe
“either pay the United States for its great military protection, or protect themselves” as a cautionary tale
against reliance on the United States.55 Wary of shifting political winds and what some in India see as an
alliance of convenience, India’s strategic thinkers
are cautious about hitching India’s horse to America’s wagon. In fact, a politically daunting percentage
of Indians today are suspicious or distrustful of the
United States, which makes it that much more difficult
for India’s leaders to advocate for closer ties.
There are also concerns among India’s strategic planners about the potential second-order consequences of an increased alliance with the United
States. Above all, India wants to avoid having an overreliance on any one source of military equipment and
technology, lest that source of new equipment (and
spare parts for existing equipment) be lost for whatever
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reason. Russia remains India’s largest legacy supplier
of weaponry, particularly in aviation, accounting for
75 percent of Indian imports from 2004 to 2014. Notably, the balance has shifted closer to equality with the
United States in recent years: from 2014 to 2016, India
sent US$5 billion to Russia for defense equipment,
and US$4.4 billion to the United States.56 India does
not want to become dependent on the United States
for defense equipment, nor alienate Russia as a supplier. This desire supports the argument against major
financial outlays for expensive weapons systems
from either source, as such an investment may create
an imbalance which may further imply an offsetting
purchase from the other. Thus, acquisitions become a
diplomatic balancing act. For their parts, both Russia
and the United States are concerned about the classified capabilities of advanced defense systems that
have been supplied to India being inadvertently disclosed to the other, which adds another dimension to
technology transfer considerations within the bureaucracies of the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense. France and the Euro-Arab Dialogue
remain a somewhat-distant third place in arms sales to
India, but serve as a reminder that India is not putting
all of its eggs in two baskets. It is also worth noting
that the United States has generally been more successful in complying with the “Make in India” initiative in arms sales contracts with India than Russia has
been. However, Russia has had success with a number
of aviation contracts under the “Make in India” initiative, including the sale of 200 Kamov Ka-226 twinengine Russian utility helicopters.
Finally, political assessments made in Washington about India’s strategic situation, such as the
assumption that, because it is surrounded by potential
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adversaries, India would naturally seek strategic
allies, are less germane than they first appear. Beyond
a circle of strategists, academics, and military planners in the Indian defense intelligentsia who take a
more pragmatic view of a dangerous neighborhood,
the spirit of self-sufficiency and freedom from outside
influence runs deep in Indian politics. Underpinning
concerns in New Delhi, these social realities are more
complicated than Washington’s assumptions generally allow, and are equally as daunting as the political
realities.
Reactions from Pakistan and the PRC
Any attempt to enhance the U.S.-India strategic
partnership almost invariably will elicit adverse reactions from both of India’s long-standing adversaries,
Pakistan and the PRC. Pakistan, during the Cold War,
successfully placed an important brake on any attempt
at security cooperation between India and the United
States. The United States, which was often solicitous
of Pakistan’s views, acquiesced to Pakistani demands
with some regularity. A small handful of examples
illustrate this proposition.
As early as 1954, Pakistan’s political leadership
successfully persuaded the United States to forge a
bilateral military pact, claiming that it was a staunch
anti-communist ally. The Dwight Eisenhower administration, which knew little about the complexities of
the regional politics of the subcontinent, acquiesced
to these entreaties. At the time, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Eisenhower, making it clear
that U.S. weapons transfers would not be used to fend
off communist expansion but, rather, would be used
against India. Eisenhower, in an attempt to reassure
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India, offered to also provide suitable military assistance. Nehru, who spearheaded the Non-Aligned
Movement, rebuffed Eisenhower’s offer.
Later, in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian
border war, a trauma from which India has to yet fully
recover, it sought increased military assistance from
the United States. The United States initially proved
willing to provide such assistance. However, when
Pakistan, a formal American ally, raised sharp objections, the United States decided not to provide any
substantial amounts of weaponry. This experience,
among other factors, over time, would lead India to
steadily drift into the Soviet orbit. The Soviets, in turn,
adroitly bolstered their relationship with India via a
generous arms transfer arrangement.57
Even in the post-Cold War era, Pakistan has, until
very recently, managed to exercise a unit veto on some
Indian efforts to engage the United States on matters
of regional security. Nowhere is this more evident
than in Afghanistan. For example, in the aftermath
of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the
subsequent U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee offered Indian air bases
for the supplying of American forces in the country.
Once again, concerned about possible Pakistani misgivings, the George W. Bush administration declined
the Indian offer. Subsequently, Pakistan also successfully convinced the Bush and Obama administrations
to limit India’s activities in Afghanistan, claiming that
an expansion of the Indian role would be inimical to
Pakistan’s national security interests. Yet again, both
administrations gave in to Pakistan’s demands.
The PRC has long acted in concert with Pakistan to
undermine India’s security interests in the region. This
relationship was forged shortly after the Sino-Indian
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border war.58 Since then, Pakistan, for all practical
purposes, has emerged as a strategic surrogate for the
PRC in South Asia. It has been the recipient of substantial military and economic assistance, it has obtained
support for its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs, and it has enjoyed diplomatic support on a
host of critical issues. Among other activities, the PRC
has repeatedly prevented Pakistan-based terrorists
from being placed on the UN list of global terrorists.59
Given this close strategic nexus, quite apart from more
specific concerns about an incipient U.S.-India strategic partnership, there is little or no question that the
PRC would react adversely to any attempt to bolster
U.S.-India strategic ties. There is ample evidence of the
PRC’s hostility toward any form of strategic cooperation between India and the United States. For example,
when Bush announced his intention to withdraw from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, India, under
Prime Minister Vajpayee, endorsed the decision.60 The
reaction from the PRC was just short of vituperative.
More recently, the PRC has been downright hostile toward the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
of 2008 on the grounds that India is not a member of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime. Subsequently, the PRC has been the principal stumbling
block to India joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
despite American support for the country’s candidacy.61 The PRC has also looked askance at India’s participation in the quadrilateral or “Quad” arrangement
involving Australia, India, Japan, and the United
States.62
Given this record, there is little or no question that
both Pakistan and the PRC would respond adversely
to any strengthening of the U.S.-India strategic partnership. In fact, if the U.S.-India partnership acquires
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greater momentum, it is entirely possible, and indeed
likely, that the Pakistan-PRC strategic nexus will be
bolstered in response. The PRC has already made a
substantial financial commitment to Pakistan through
its “belt and road initiative” and is a major weapons
supplier to the country.
Despite the likely reactions from the PRC and
Pakistan, neither the United States nor India should
hesitate from proceeding apace with their strategic
partnership, as the deepening of PRC-Pakistan ties will
almost certainly occur in any case, and should be seen
as a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc. Moreover, the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship, even during the Cold War,
was transactional.63 Even since the Cold War’s end,
the basic features of this relationship have remained
unchanged. Indeed, some have argued that U.S. reliance on Pakistan to pursue its interests in Afghanistan
has been fundamentally flawed.64
Obviously, the U.S.-China relationship is far more
involved and complex. The Trump administration’s
recent trade sanctions and tariff regime have only
added to this complexity. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for the United States to concern itself
with the growing assertiveness of the PRC in Asia.65
Given India’s fears and misgivings about the PRC,
the gradual but perceptible decline in India’s reflexive
anti-Americanism creates the potential for the country
to begin to push back against further Chinese expansionist behavior. To that end, the United States has
already made suitable overtures, even as China has
cast a wary eye on them.66 Consequently, regardless
of the likely reactions of the PRC, it makes eminent
sense for the United States to continue with its efforts
to engage India on a range of strategic issues.
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STRATEGIC COOPERATION: AREAS THAT
HAVE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER SUCCESS
Technology Sharing and Defense Manufacturing
In 2011, India chose not to purchase the U.S. F-16
fighter that had been in contention along with five
other aircraft, narrowing its choices to the Eurofighter
Typhoon and the French Rafale. The proposed sale was
for a tender that the Indian Government had released
to acquire some 126 medium multi-role combat air
craft to replace the aging workhorse of the Indian Air
Force, the Mig-21. Though the argument for not shortlisting the Lockheed Martin F-16 was made on technical grounds,67 it is widely believed in U.S. policy
circles that political considerations also played an
important role. The Congress Party-led UPA regime,
some highly placed U.S. Government officials argue,
simply could not handle the political freight of turning
over yet another major defense contract to the United
States.68 Earlier that same year, India had acquired 10
C-17 heavy lift aircraft at a cost of US$4.1 billion from
the United States. Today, the internal debate over the
F-16 drags on.
After the Trump administration assumed office,
then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis visited India
and made a significant pitch for expanding the existing band of defense cooperation.69 Despite the Trump
administration’s stated interest in building on the
existing defense relationship with India and the Modi
regime’s apparent willingness to boost the relationship, the bureaucratic hurdles that previously hobbled defense cooperation remain in place. Indian
decision-making structures remain hidebound, and
India’s policy on offsets often proves to be an obstacle
to U.S. defense firms.70
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That said, a number of projects involving defense
cooperation appear to be on the anvil. A handful of
examples should illustrate the prospects of increased
defense cooperation. In 2017, for example, the United
States approved the sale of the General Atomics Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System to the Indian
Navy. This system will be incorporated into India’s
second indigenous aircraft carrier which, at the
moment, is in its planning stage. This technology is
significant because it allows for more sorties from a
carrier and reduces the thermal signature of the vessel.71 Earlier in 2017, one of India’s largest industrial
conglomerates, Reliance Industries, announced an
agreement with the U.S. Navy for the repair and servicing of its warships at its Pipavav shipyard in Gujarat. This was made possible by the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement.72
Other possible cooperative projects are still under
discussion. In February 2018, the United States made
an offer to India to co-produce armored personnel
carriers in conjunction with Israel. Given that India
already has significant defense cooperation arrangements with Israel, the possibility of this trilateral venture coming to fruition looks promising.73
Despite these developments, three hurdles may
still hobble an expansion of U.S.-India defense cooperation. First, India’s defense procurement system
stands in acute need of reform. It is complex, labyrinthine, slow, and unlikely to be reformed anytime soon.74 Second, in a related vein and as has been
already discussed, residual misgivings about the
reliability of American weapons transfers still linger
within important segments of India’s defense establishment. Consequently, those figures may well seek
to limit the scope of India’s defense cooperation with
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the United States. Third, the Modi regime’s emphasis
on “Make in India” may not dovetail with the Trump
administration’s export policies, which are focused on
boosting American weapons exports. Of course, none
of these hurdles are insuperable. However, American
policymakers need to bear them in mind as efforts to
engage India in this realm continue apace.
Intelligence Cooperation
There is solid potential for greater intelligence
cooperation between the United States and India.
However, both powers’ intelligence services would
have to overcome their intrinsic wariness and some
heavy historical baggage. Day-to-day cooperation
currently takes place through the usual diplomatic
channels. Joint talks and exchanges of visits between
high-level intelligence officials have been taking place
twice a year for several years under the rubric of the
“strategic defense dialogue” (once each year in the
United States and once in India, at 6-month intervals), although not without some cloak-and-dagger
secrecy about identities and locations. Such precautions highlight the degree of caution with which both
sides approach the discussions. In the intelligence
business, officials are concerned above all with protecting sources and methods—the identities of their
sources of information and how it is obtained—and
avoiding the compromise of such information via
leaks or moles. Mutual trust in the intelligence world
takes a very long time to develop and can be quickly
broken if a source is uncovered by a friendly country. Another hurdle to greater cooperation between
the United States and India is a sense of inequality
among senior Indian intelligence officials in regard to
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the flow of information to and from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). According to Major General V.
K. Singh (Ret.), who previously served in Indian intelligence, there is considerable resentment that the CIA
shares very little intelligence with India but routinely
pressures India to provide more.75
Further complicating matters, the path toward
U.S.-India intelligence cooperation has been a rocky
one. Several incidents planted the seeds of mistrust
along the way that have taken root. For example, in
1997, two junior CIA officers in New Delhi had unauthorized meetings with senior Intelligence Bureau official Ratan Sehgal and were ordered out of the country
as persona non grata. The United States reciprocated
with the expulsion of two Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) personnel working at the Indian Consulate in San Francisco, CA.76 This is fairly standard
spy-versus-spy probing in the world of clandestine
services, but hardly the sort of behavior that builds
trust between friendly countries. Things became much
more serious and took a sharp turn for the worse
in 2004, when Rabinder Singh, the Joint Secretary
of RAW for Southeast Asia, defected to the United
States via the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu, which
had issued him and his wife U.S. passports under
assumed names and flew them to the United States.77
As Jane’s Security News noted with understatement at
the time, the incident—which also implicated Israel’s
Mossad—was “likely to result in New Delhi placing
limitations on intelligence sharing with both the USA
and Israel, which could impact on the US-led ‘war on
terrorism’.”78
It should also be noted that while the CIA and
RAW are the main components of the intelligence
apparatus of the United States and India, respectively,
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they are not the only components. The United States
has a total of 17 agencies and organizations which
collect intelligence.79 In India, the National Technical
Research Organization was created after 2000 as the
hub of India’s drones, spy satellites, and reconnaissance aircraft, similar to the U.S. National Security
Agency and National Reconnaissance Office. After
2000, India also created a Defense Intelligence Agency
that is similar to the organization of the same name
within the U.S. Department of Defense and is charged
with similar reporting responsibilities.
Regardless of these complexities and challenges,
India and the United States share the same primary
concern—terrorists in South Asia—and both countries’ intelligence communities are focused intensively
on tracking and eliminating these terrorists. India’s
RAW is responsible for external intelligence gathering. The Intelligence Bureau, from which RAW was
spun off in 1968, is still responsible for intelligence
within India, much like the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation. RAW is among the best intelligence
services in the world, both highly capable and highly
professional. Its greatest strength is the U.S. intelligence community’s greatest weakness—human intelligence. Over the past few decades, RAW has had
exceptional success in this domain. Conversely, the
greatest strength of the United States in intelligence
gathering is in what is euphemistically referred to as
“national technical means.” For example, during the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks with the Soviet
Union, the United States used cutting-edge technology to acquire intelligence without human agents
on the ground. While RAW has some capabilities in
this area, and indeed has had some notable and welldocumented successes in the past, it is far behind the
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United States in this regard. Conversely, the CIA has
struggled to penetrate terrorist organizations in Pakistan with human sources. Therefore, the two countries
have capabilities that are mutually complementary.
Each service is stronger where the other is weaker, creating the potential for genuine synergy in combating
terrorism in South Asia. The intelligence communities
of both countries report directly to their national leaders: RAW to the Prime Minister of India and the CIA
to the President of the United States. In addition, both
are otherwise only subject to a degree of legislative
oversight via congressional committees. Thus, any
progress toward greater cooperation would require
both sanction and impetus from the highest levels
of both governments and approval from the career
bureaucrats in both organizations. There remains the
likelihood of intelligence being stalled at the working
level by officers with long memories.
Counterterrorism and Special Operations
Both the United States and India have complex and
sometimes internally overlapping counterterrorism
organizations. In India, RAW, the Intelligence Bureau,
and the Defense Intelligence Agency are statutorily
authorized to conduct external operations.80 In addition, the Indian Army and Navy have specialized military units capable of small-scale strikes of a limited
military nature. This is one of the richest potential
areas for expanded cooperation in the near term for a
number of reasons. First, such training is generally classified, so there is less likelihood that joint training will
be subjected to public scrutiny and, thus, would have
less potential for political blowback for New Delhi. In
fact, given the political emphasis in both countries on
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counterterrorism, there would likely be little political
objection to any cross training which would enhance
the skills of all involved in this domain, as there is
strong, domestic, popular support in both countries
for strengthening the mechanisms of counterterrorism. Second, these forces in both countries are training almost all the time when they are not deployed,
so opportunities for cooperation are plentiful. Third,
some of the training is in tactical skills and exercises,
which are common enough to both countries (with relatively minor variations), so there is little or no concern at that level about sharing classified information.
Both sides may have classified delivery systems and
capabilities that they would prefer not to reveal, but
there are also common techniques, skills, and competitive wargaming that would make training useful and
challenging for both. Indeed, a considerable amount
of such training is already being conducted, and both
sides seem to benefit from it. For example, after the
annual U.S.-India joint training Exercise Yuhd Abhyas
in Alaska in 2016, a U.S. Army Special Forces Soldier
noted that “within the first 2 [or] 3 days, I was learning
tactics that I never would have thought of, and that in
some ways were better than ours.”81
U.S. Special Operations Forces have also trained
with Indian counterparts on at least two other recent
exercises, Exercise Tarkash and Exercise Vajra Prahar.
The first Tarkash training exercise took place in 2015,
involving India’s National Security Guards (popularly known as “Black Cats”), who are considered the
best counterterrorism force of the Ministry of Home
Affairs. A second Tarkash exercise with the National
Security Guards was repeated in March 2017. In January 2016, U.S. and Indian Special Forces also restarted
Vajra Prahar, a small-scale training exercise focused
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on small-unit special operations. Personnel of the 2nd
Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), conducted Exercise Vajra Prahar again from January 18
to January 29, 2018, at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in
Washington State and Camp Rilea in Oregon.
Notably, all of these exercises involved only U.S.
Army Special Forces. Other military branches of both
services appear to be lagging behind in joint training;
however, the Indian Navy has sent commandos to the
U.S. Navy SEALs for training. As part of joint naval
Exercise Malabar in September 2017, there was also
joint training between the special operations forces
of the Indian and U.S. navies at Indian Naval Station
Karna (Visakhapatnam). There has been some speculation that, while not lacking the physical stamina
of their U.S. counterparts, the Indian Navy commandos lag behind in high-tech weaponry and advanced
support technology, such as dedicated armed drones
and specialized assets to deliver them to their objectives. This lag in technology is perhaps a secondorder consequence of India’s long-standing focus
on internal self-defense rather than offensive operations and resulting budgeting priorities. If Indian
Navy commandos were operating more like a 20thcentury commando force, with more emphasis on welltrained soldiers and less on technology than would a
21st-century force that leverages advanced technology across the operating spectrum, then, in turn, this
would hamper advanced joint training with the commandos’ U.S. counterparts. This dichotomy could
explain the apparent paucity of current joint exercises.
Alternatively, they could simply be classified. Whatever the case, in overall strategic terms, there is plenty
of room in the domain of counterterrorism—in forces,
equipment, and training—for greater cooperation and
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perhaps, eventually, even interoperability. This potential would be enhanced if India were to follow the lead
of the United States in creating a joint special operations command (like the U.S. Southern Command)
which would bring operational control of all of India’s
Special Forces and special operations forces under one
roof. See figure 2.

Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Ashley Armstrong.

Figure 2. Indian and American paratroopers during
Exercise Yudh Abyhas in Alaska in 201082
Naval Interoperability
At first blush, navy-to-navy cooperation and
interoperability between the United States and India
appear to be promising areas for expanded security cooperation. As noted, the United States is eager
for expanded military-to-military cooperation, but
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because of the negative domestic political optics for
India, conventional land force exercises and cooperation are limited to small numbers of U.S. personnel on
Indian soil. Thus far, the U.S.-India cooperation efforts
have been largely confined to humanitarian training
missions, like preparing for disaster relief operations.
Cooperation between the two countries’ air forces is
constrained by other obstacles. However, naval exercises on the high seas would seem to offer an arena
for military cooperation far from the public eye. Most
navy maneuvers, such as “steaming in column,” (i.e.,
in single file at a common speed) are universal to
all navies. While the Indian Army is focused almost
exclusively on the internal defense of India’s borders,
blue water navies are, by definition, an expression of
national power on the high seas. Most importantly,
regarding concerns about China’s growing influence
over the routes of global commerce, it is, of course, the
sea lines of communication across the Indian Ocean
which trouble strategists, not so much land corridors
across the Indian subcontinent. Even with an unalterable strategic focus on homeland defense, India’s
leaders understand that protecting India does not stop
at the water’s edge. Indeed, India has been moving
toward a blue water navy for more than a decade,
and clearly recognizes that in modern naval theory,
this automatically entails the fusion of operations of
subsurface, surface, aviation, and satellite assets. The
age of the stand-alone surface warship ended before
India was born, and India’s strategic naval planning
in the fields of submarine warfare and carrier aviation clearly reflect this awareness. Thus, navy-to-navy
cooperation and exercises would seem to be an ideal
venue for cutting some of the Gordian Knots constraining the other services.
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In reality, however, such cooperation does not go
far beyond the public affairs optics. The most recent
U.S.-India joint naval maneuvers theoretically took
place in the framework of the old “Quad,” the informal
security constellation of Australia, India, Japan, and
the United States which first appeared about a decade
ago. The maneuvers were known as Exercise Malabar.
The most recent Exercise Malabar was conducted in
June 2018 near the island of Guam. This exercise was
theoretical in the framework of the “Quad” because
India again refused to allow Australia to participate in
the exercise, frustrating U.S. hopes of building a cohesive maritime bulwark against nascent but growing
Chinese naval power.83
Joint U.S.-India naval exercises have exposed
several layers of problems in maritime cooperation,
from the strategic level to the tactical. An account of
his experience as a liaison officer on an Indian naval
vessel in 2001 by a U.S. Navy lieutenant, for example,
caused considerable internet controversy, as it was
sharply critical of the Indian Navy’s capabilities.84
Whether exaggerated or not, the account raised genuine questions about the skill of the Indian Navy in seamanship and joint operations, noting difficulties with
rudimentary NATO codebooks, ship-to-ship signaling, and sometimes dangerously weak ship-handling
skills when in close proximity to other vessels. The
state of upkeep and maintenance of the Indian vessels
was also reportedly poor. A spate of accidents earlier
this decade has lent some credence to such accusations
of a lack of professionalism in the Indian Navy.85
At the strategic level, the possession of aircraft carriers and submarines does not ensure that a country is
a force to be reckoned with at sea, any more than the
possession of a Formula One race car can ensure that
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the owner is a force to be reckoned with in a Formula
One race (a reality which should be taken into account
when assessing China’s naval buildup as well). In fact,
only the United States has the combat experience
in continuous operations of multiple carrier battle
groups that allows its navy to become an expert in
this incredibly complex form of warfare. Furthermore,
only France and the United States currently operate
fixed-wing aircraft carriers with steam catapults for
launching aircraft (instead of ski jump ramps used by
China, India, and Russia), which are vastly superior
for flight operations.86 The fact is, India (and China)
are decades (and 10 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers)
behind the U.S. Navy in blue water power. The point
is that simply building ships creates potential, but
does not build capability. Beyond political presence,
in comparison to the world’s major naval powers,
the Indian Navy in 2018 would bring relatively little
to a fight. More troubling for the U.S.-India strategic
partnership are multiple indications in 2018 of India’s
wavering strategic commitment to the Quad itself and
a preference for appeasing China over confronting it.
India has been called “the weak link in the Quad.” 87
At the tactical level of war, in regional naval drills,
India has been called “the odd man out.”88 U.S., Japanese, and Australian warships use common satellite
data links and electronic combat systems, but India
uses Russian-made equipment and refuses to use even
temporary, suitcase-portable data links for Exercise
Malabar, forcing all vessels to use crude, unencrypted,
ship-to-ship radio communications and obsolete
NATO handwritten maneuver codes with which the
Indian ships struggle. This is indicative of the level of
fundamental mistrust of the U.S. military that India
retains. Furthermore, India has no amphibious warfare
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capability and no doctrine for conducting it. In fact,
many of the same obstacles to genuinely useful exercises between the two countries’ air forces also affect
naval exercises. For example, India operates Russian
Sukhoi jets from its aircraft carrier, and when they fly
in Exercise Malabar, their radars and electronic warfare jammers are turned off.
Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
recently termed the Indian and Pacific Oceans a “single
strategic arena.” In his vision of the United States and
India as regional “bookends,”89 Tillerson described
the future of U.S.-India naval operations as leading to
“great co-ordination . . . including maritime domain
awareness, anti-submarine warfare, amphibious warfare . . . and search and rescue.”90 However, this vision
is chimerical. Joint naval exercises do send a political
signal, but the reality on the water is that mistrust of
the United States, wavering commitment to the Quad,
a universal lack of experience in modern multidomain
naval warfare in the Indian Navy, and a complete
lack of systems interoperability with the United States
across the board make such maneuvers “more about
‘cultural familiarisation’ than drills for joint combat.”91
Neither side will admit it but, for the foreseeable
future, real operational navy-to-navy cooperation will
remain largely a public relations exercise.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is a domain in which there is a surprising amount of impetus and potential for greater
security cooperation, given the overarching climate
of distrust toward the United States which still pervades much of India’s foreign and defense policy
class.92 However, this cooperation has unusually deep
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roots. An initial vehicle for the partnership was established in 2001, when the U.S.-India Cyber Security
Forum was organized, one of the first such cooperative dialogues in the world.93 Although it was initially
hobbled by the widespread trust deficit, the Pakistan
Government-sponsored attack on Mumbai by members of Lashkar-e-Taiba in November 2008 provided a
powerful incentive for greater cooperation in counterterrorism in general and in the cybersecurity domain
in particular. The result was a memorandum of understanding in July 2011 that made the original Cyber
Security Forum much more useful and productive.94
Cybersecurity cooperation continued to gain momentum in 2012 and 2013, such that, during the fourth U.S.India Strategic Dialogue in New Delhi, attended by
then-Secretary of State John Kerry and then-Indian
External Affairs Minister Shri Salman Khurshid, the
two men:
emphasized the need for the United States and India
to develop stronger partnerships on cyber-security,
including through the next iterations of the Cyber Security
Consultations, the Strategic Cyber Policy Dialogue,
and the Information and Communications Technology
Working Group.95

This, in turn, led to the negotiation of the Framework Agreement for the U.S.-India Cyber Relationship, announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi
and then-U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2016
during Modi’s visit to the United States. The bilateral agreement also saw the formal announcement
of India’s designation as a U.S. “Major Defense Partner.”96 The Framework Agreement addressed all
aspects of cyberspace cooperation, not just security,
and since it was the first such agreement the United
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States had signed, it was a landmark security achievement. The fact that the United States and India have
been the global bilateral pioneers in this area, and have
established such a solid legal and bureaucratic foundation for cyber cooperation, suggests broad buy-in by
government agencies in both countries. This is especially important because cybersecurity issues are not
compartmentalized, and often overlap with criminal
activity, including money laundering; malicious, nonstate, civilian hacking; and organized, state-sponsored
attempts to breach computer security. Such a broad
agreement makes cross-agency cooperation in the
United States easier and faster. Of particular interest in
this respect, 2 months after the Framework Agreement
was signed in August 2016, Indian Minister of Defense
Manohar Parrikar visited the United States and toured
U.S. Cyber Command in Fort Meade, MD, an event
that headlined in the public relations announcements
of both countries at the time.97 Such carefully choreographed bilateral visits are designed to send specific
messages, and this one appeared to be: “cybersecurity cooperation is now something both countries are
taking seriously.”
Space
While U.S.-India space cooperation is in its
infancy, there is a potential defense aspect to it. In
2016, the two countries established a bilateral space
cooperation mechanism for the purpose of deconflicting orbits, avoiding collisions, and sharing information about potentially dangerous orbital material
falling back to earth.98 Typically, the United States is
not the only country to which India is reaching out
for space cooperation. India signed space agreements
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with Japan in November 2016 for “earth observation,
satellite based navigation, space sciences, and lunar
exploration;”99 with Israel in July 2017 to put more
Israeli satellites in space aboard Indian rockets;100 and
with France’s Central National D’Etudes Spatiales
in March 2018 for maritime surveillance—an agreement which notably accompanied an announcement
on further France-India nuclear power cooperation.101
What these latter agreements make abundantly clear
is that, as with defense procurement, India has no
intention of falling into the “strategic orbit” of any
one country, and, as with arms purchases and military cooperation, India’s strategic calculus will remain
deliberately multilateral and diversified. India’s capabilities in space are impressive. Its reliable workhorse launch platform, the Polar Satellite Launch
Vehicle-C40 (PSLV-C40), holds the record for most
satellites successfully put into orbit by one rocket
(104).102 As the Indian publication The Diplomat
recently noted of India’s space program, “the security implications have not gone unnoticed by India’s
regional rival, Pakistan.”103 It can be safely assumed
that India’s space program has not gone unnoticed by
China as well. What India lacks in this area, however,
is any sort of overarching space strategy or centralized
space asset management. Its approach thus far—the
dual use of its orbital fleet—might be best described as
“let’s get a lot of stuff up there and organize it later.”
As the United States has more satellites in orbit (568)
than the next four countries combined (Russia, China,
Japan, and the United Kingdom), space asset management would be a logical area for enhanced U.S.India strategic cooperation in the future.104 However,
in March 2018, India set back space cooperation with
the United States with the unauthorized launch of
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four private U.S. commercial satellites, despite their
being denied regulatory approval by the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission.105
RECOMMENDATIONS
What recommendations can be offered to policymakers and officials in Washington and New Delhi
about how best to strengthen the strategic partnership? If the two parties value the partnership, they
both will need to make some key compromises to
ensure that it thrives in the foreseeable future. To that
end, we suggest some general and specific steps that
each side should consider taking to move the partnership forward.
At the outset, the United States needs to sustain
the policy of de-hyphenation: it cannot again allow
Pakistan to hold the U.S.-India relationship hostage
to its whims and vagaries. As argued herein, Pakistan has proven to be unreliable. Multiple and varied
attempts on the part of the United States to induce
Pakistan to align its security interests with the Western world have, for the most part, failed to produce
results. Allowing the endless repetition of the carefully constructed Pakistani “we have nukes and we’re
very fragile” narrative to continue to limit the scope
of the U.S.-India relationship makes little sense. Maintaining the momentum of the ongoing shift in American policy in the South Asia region toward India and
away from trying to buy Pakistani cooperation would
greatly enhance the prospects of greater strategic
cooperation.
In a related vein, the United States should encourage India to expand its footprint in Afghanistan with a
view toward the long-term stabilization of the country.
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Such a stance, no doubt, will generate alarm in Islamabad, which already sees an Indian agent behind every
rock north of the Khyber Pass. Once again, given its
decades of duplicity, Pakistan should not be allowed
to exercise a veto on this matter. India, as a number
of dispassionate observers have argued, has played an
invaluable role in Afghanistan and can continue to do
so.
The United States should also be willing to step
up and resolutely support India if the PRC continues
to exert pressure on India’s Himalayan borders. For
India, the PRC remains the long-term strategic threat.
On its own, India lacks the capacity to cope with the
threat. An explicit American commitment to back India
would significantly assuage its security concerns and
would also generate much needed trust in the U.S.India security relationship. Specifically, the United
States could issue a demarche, warning the PRC not
to continue actions that seek to alter the territorial
status quo along the disputed border. What form this
hypothetical commitment and support would take,
however, is certainly contentious, and China knows a
demarche without teeth is just a piece of paper. Even
a policy of deliberate ambiguity still requires a credible deterrent or credible capabilities, and these would
require considerably deeper military-to-military ties
than India seems willing to countenance in 2018.
Finally, from the U.S. side, the United States
should address India’s complaints about intelligence
sharing, especially on the vexing question of the Pakistani military establishment’s continuing alliance with
a range of terrorist groups. These terrorist groups and
their Pakistani enablers have long wreaked havoc on
India and have repeatedly precipitated crises between
the two states. Enhanced U.S. intelligence assistance
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would help to rebuild trust, as would increased material assistance to India for closing the gaps and loopholes in India’s own intelligence gathering on this
continuing threat. This is an area where the United
States would need to demonstrate a willingness to
take a calculated risk to build trust by sharing more
information than it currently does.
Obviously, India cannot expect the United States
to sustain the momentum of this partnership on its
own. It too needs to demonstrate a greater willingness
to work with the United States on a range of extant
matters. To that end, we suggest a number of possible
initiatives that New Delhi should pursue.
Despite the persistence of Cold War-era nostalgia
within parts of India’s security apparatus, it is more
than apparent that the U.S.-Russia arms transfer relationship is fraught with a host of problems. Russia has
been stingy in transferring technology to India while
being rapacious in terms of increasing the number of
weapons contracts while not being able to sustain a
technological edge in the production of advanced
weaponry. Under the circumstances, it behooves
India to more actively engage with the United
States to not only acquire weapons, but to seek coproduction arrangements as well. Only a robust arms
transfer relationship with the United States would be
impactful in addressing India’s burgeoning security
needs. To that end, New Delhi needs to implement
major reforms to simplify and streamline its weapon
acquisition procedures. The current mechanisms for
weapons purchases are cumbersome and inefficient.
In a related vein, India also needs to move ahead
with a number of foundational agreements with the
United States that would facilitate communications,
logistics, and intelligence sharing. None of these
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agreements are especially exceptional, and the United
States has them with a host of other friendly nations.
However, both a domestic campaign of disinformation in India and unfounded fears of a diminution of
India’s sovereignty have hobbled the realization of
these agreements.
In addition, India needs to address the legal barriers that it erected to foreign investment in its civilian
nuclear power sector. Under the terms of the existing
legal regime, U.S. companies, for all practical purposes, cannot invest in this arena. In this context, it is
necessary to underscore that few within India’s policy
circles seem to adequately appreciate the extent of
political capital that two U.S. administrations have
expended to bring India into the ambit of the global
nonproliferation regime, despite India’s unwillingness
to accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty.
In addition, India should work to routinize and
expand the scope of the military exercises that it holds
with the United States. India also needs to overcome
its inhibitions about allowing greater professional contacts between the members of its armed services and
their American counterparts, especially at the higher
levels of command. Currently, U.S. military attachés
at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi cannot even telephone their counterparts in the Indian Army and Ministry of Defense directly. Even visiting U.S. civilian
defense scholars cannot make appointments directly
with Indian military personnel and civilian government defense officials. Every single contact between
a U.S. citizen and any Indian defense or military official must be authorized on a case-by-case basis by a
bureaucrat in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
This archaic, vestigial artifact of the Cold War and
the Non-Aligned Movement, perhaps more than any
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other single regulation, is severely hampering discussion and practical cooperation between the two partners, and could almost literally be eliminated with the
stroke of a pen.
With the possible exception of the last, none of
these recommendations can be easily or swiftly implemented. They are all likely to encounter both policy
and bureaucratic resistance in both capitals and
beyond. Both sides harbor troubling memories of the
Cold War years and have misgivings about the reliability of each other’s commitments. However, unless
they evince a willingness to undertake some risks
and help promote a culture of reciprocity and trust, it
seems unlikely that the strategic partnership that has
been forged over the course of the past 2 decades will
make much progress in the foreseeable future. While
both parties have made significant investments in
fashioning this strategic partnership so far, and have
overcome various hurdles to cooperation, a moment
has now arrived when bolder steps need to be taken to
ensure that the partnership will help meet the shared
security challenges that loom over the horizon.
CONCLUSION
Are the United States and India unnatural partners? Can they actually forge a meaningful strategic
partnership that goes beyond bromides and handshakes? At the end of the Cold War, this question may
have been superfluous at best and chimerical at worst.
The lack of strategic convergence in the relationship
virtually precluded the forging of a viable partnership. However, given the movement that has taken
place in U.S.-India relations over the past 2 decades,
it is now possible to envisage circumstances under
which the partnership might gain real traction. The
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United States must accept that one size does not fit
all in security partnerships, avoid condescension, recognize the paramount importance of the sovereignty
issue for India, and stress genuine equality in the relationship. India must move away from the mental artifacts of nonalignment and a patchwork quilt approach
to defense acquisitions, which vastly complicates the
country’s logistics and repair sectors. Even so, there
is no obvious or simple path forward or easy answers
to these difficult questions. The strategic and political
gaps remain broad and deep. Consequently, even at
this stage of progress, our prognosis must be hedged
with various caveats. Much depends on how developments evolve at global, regional, and national levels
beyond the bilateral equation.
At a global level, if the PRC continues to press
ahead with its activities in the South China Sea and,
more importantly, seeks to expand its naval presence
in the Indian Ocean, it is reasonable to surmise that
the Trump administration will continue to challenge
it militarily through its traditional naval presence as
it has done the past 2 years (and as the Obama administration did before that). As the U.S. administration
maintains its longstanding naval presence in the
Indo-Pacific, it will inevitably call on India to step up
its own activities. In 2016, then-Minister of Defense
Manohar Parrikar rebuffed Admiral Harry Harris’s
suggestion that the two counties undertake joint naval
patrols. However, in the future, India may be more
inclined to move forward with them, especially as the
naval arrangement with Japan and the United States
(and possibly Australia, if India gets off the strategic
fence) becomes more robust—and if the technological
impediments to 21st-century, networked, joint operations can be reduced or eliminated. Commitment
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on India’s part to a genuine, four-sided naval alliance, without a doubt, would significantly enhance
the quality of the current strategic partnership. Many
senior U.S. Navy officers and defense officials privately view India’s reluctance to commit to its own
maritime security as intimidated dithering, if not outright appeasement.
Regional developments will also help shape the
evolution of the partnership. The Obama administration gradually reduced aid to Pakistan by nearly
two-thirds; the Trump administration accelerated the
reduction dramatically and halted virtually all aid in
an effort to induce Pakistan further to end its support
for the Taliban in Afghanistan. This policy shift, obviously, has been welcomed in New Delhi, which had
long highlighted Pakistan’s duplicity. The first question, of course, is whether the Trump administration
proves willing to sustain this course. If it does, it can
reasonably expect India to step up its role in Afghanistan. Such an expansion of India’s role might involve
providing more support to the Afghan security forces.
The recent transfer of Russian-made helicopters to
the Afghan National Air Force was a helpful step in
the right direction. Greater involvement would not
be without controversy within India. However, the
Indian security establishment also should accept that
fashioning a genuine strategic partnership would
entail some costs. The second question is whether
such developments would drive Pakistan still deeper
into China’s web and deepen its Faustian bargain for
its national sovereignty in exchange for Chinese-built
infrastructure of the type made by Sri Lanka. It seems
headed in that direction regardless of the U.S.-India
nexus.
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In this context, given the Trump administration’s
hostility toward Iran and India’s existing relationship
with Tehran, the two sides may have to find a modus
vivendi to avoid this issue undermining other shared
interests. The Trump administration has sought to
gather support for isolating Iran, a goal long sought
by Israel for a number of reasons, including Iran’s
support for various terrorist organizations. It is also
hardly an exaggeration to suggest that it has significant reservations about the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action reached with Iran under the Obama
administration. The installation of the hawkish John
Bolton as National Security Advisor tilted the United
States toward open hostilities with Iran. India, on the
other hand, sees Iran as an invaluable partner in containing Pakistan and enhancing its vital access route
to Afghanistan via the Chabahar Port. The U.S. agreement in November 2018 to make an exception for the
Chabahar Port in its sanctions against Iran was an
important concession to India and an adroit hedging
of logistics bets in the ongoing Afghan conflict.
Finally, national policies may prove to be the
most important determinant of the future of this partnership. Will the Trump administration continue to
invest in efforts in persuading India to align its views
with those of the United States when it comes to dealing with the PRC? Alternatively, will it tire of India’s
fence-sitting and simply seek to work with its existing
alliance system in Asia, relying mostly on Australia
and Japan? If so, India is destined to continue to be the
odd man out. As the military capabilities of the PRC
continue to grow, as it seeks to expand its influence
in South Asia and beyond, and as it begins to project
a more formidable naval force in the Indian Ocean,
whether India’s security establishment will see the
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need to shed its past inhibitions about a closer security partnership with the United States remains an
open question. Of course, the ebb and flow of India’s
domestic politics, in some measure, may shape the
answer to this question. A government that is led or
dominated by the Indian National Congress may be
unwilling and, indeed, incapable of overcoming its
deep-seated misgivings about U.S. reliability. However, a Bharatiya Janata Party-led or a Bharatiya Janata
Party-dominated government may have a more realistic worldview and fewer compunctions about a closer
strategic embrace. These domestic factors, no doubt,
are important. However, if the perceived threat from
the PRC becomes sufficiently acute and India’s own
capacity to cope with the emergent threat is found
wanting, a willingness to work more closely with the
United States may prove to be the only viable option
for any Indian Government. Such a forced marriage
would be awkward at best.
U.S.-India strategic ties today are at an inflection
point. It is certainly possible that with deft diplomacy,
the two sides can further distance themselves from
the baggage of the past and commit to a true strategic partnership. Such a development would suggest
a future quite unlike the past. However, given the
unpredictable challenges that the rapid rise of the PRC
will pose for Asia (and, indeed, the world), leaders in
both Washington and New Delhi may deem that the
time has arrived to seize the possibility of forming an
enduring strategic partnership—natural or not.
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